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1. The epistemic significance of perceived peer disagreement 
Recently the following issue has been widely discussed by epistemologists:    
(Significance) 
What is the epistemically rational response in the face of mutually recognized 
disagreement? 
 
(Significance) pertains to what attitude an agent is epistemically rational in holding in light of 
disagreement.  
Why should we think that disagreement is of philosophical significance? One reason is that 
disagreement functions as a sort of litmus paper for detecting the presence of error (Sidgwick 1907: 
342, Christensen 2007: 8). The exact nature and significance of this error need to be scrutinized. To 
that end, we introduce three examples of disagreement about different subject matters: ordinary 
perception, arithmetic, and economic policy.  
(Perception)—You and I are traffic cops watching cars pass on Main Street. We are equally 
good, equally attentive cops, with equally reliable eyesight and regard each other as such. 
We see a truck pass through the intersection. I think that it ran the red light. You think it got 
through on yellow. (Vavova 2014: 307) 
 
(Arithmetic)—You and I add a series of ten three digit numbers in our heads. A third party 
calls out the numbers, one after the other. Each of us keeps a tally, adding the numbers as 
we go, not attempting to keep track of any particular number in the sequence after it has 
been added to the running total. Neither I nor you are particularly good at mental arithmetic. 
We both recognize this and that, when we have played this game in the past, we have made 
a more or less equal number of mistakes. This time I arrive at the number 5,863 but you 
think that this is not the right answer.  
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(Economic policy)—Alberto and Paul are both leading economists who recognize each 
other as such. They have been engaged in a long debate about economic policy in Europe, 
exchanging arguments and considerations over an extended period of time. Alberto claims 
that spending cuts are associated with economic expansions and this is because confidence-
inspiring policies will foster and not hamper economic recovery in Europe. Paul, on the 
other hand, maintains that this confidence leads to disastrous results and that austerity is a 
self-defeating policy which does great harm to European economies, making their debt grow 
even faster. 
 
When subjects take each other to be epistemically on a par, they are said to regard each other as 
epistemic peers. The idea of epistemic peerhood can be cashed out as follows (Christensen 2007 
and 2008, Feldman 2006 and 2007, Gutting 1982, Kelly 2005, Lackey 2010a and 2010b):  
(Epistemic peers) 
S1 and S2 are epistemic peers regarding p if and only if 
 
(i)  S1 and S2 are cognitive equals, i.e. they are equals with respect to cognitive  
virtues such as intelligence, thoughtfulness, competence, and freedom from 
bias, and 
 
(ii) S1 and S2 are evidential equals, i.e. they are equally familiar with the  
evidence and arguments that concern p and have considered them with equal 
care. 
 
The first condition pertains to the general cognitive profile of subjects. This impacts how they 
engage in enquiry—how they deliberate, reason, and how they search for, select, and process 
evidence. The second condition concerns the relative standing of the subjects vis-a-vis evidence 
pertaining specifically to the question whether p. 
The three cases of disagreement just presented raise the following instance of 
(Significance): 
(Significance-Peer) 
What is the epistemically rational response in the face of mutually recognized disagreement 
between subjects who take each other to be epistemic peers? 
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This is a difficult question. Some cases of disagreement involve a perceived asymmetry: one party 
takes the other to be epistemically superior, but the converse does not hold. This happens when 
someone recognized as an expert about a given subject matter disagrees with someone regarded as a 
novice. In such cases, the rational response would seem for the recognized expert to stick to her 
initial belief and for the novice to defer to her. However, the three cases just presented do not 
involve this kind of asymmetry and, thus, seem to be much harder to deal with. For this reason, 
recognized peer disagreement has been at the heart of the recent epistemological literature on 
disagreement. Different answers to (Significance-Peer) have been given. We present some 
prominent answers in the next two sections.2  
 Before proceeding let us note that some epistemologists work within a degree-theoretic 
framework, representing degrees of beliefs by real number in the unit interval (0; 1). Degrees of 
beliefs behave like subjective probabilities, indicating how likely a subject takes a given proposition 
to be. Other epistemologists work with three non-graded attitudes: belief, disbelief, and suspension 
of belief. Disbelieving p is understood as believing not-p, and suspension about whether p is 
understood as some sort of neutral attitude, contrasting with both believing and disbelieving p 
(Friedman 2013). Within the degree-theoretic framework, disagreement occurs if two subjects have 
different degrees of belief. Thus, if Sarah’s degree of belief that Paris is in France is 0.95 and Bob’s 
degree of belief in the same proposition is 0.6, Sarah and Bob disagree. Within the framework of 
full attitudes two subjects disagree if one believes p and the other disbelieves p. Both frameworks 
are widely used in the discussion of peer disagreement. For this reason we rely on both of them 
below.  
 
2. Conformism vs. non-conformism  
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There are two main views on (Significance-Peer): conformism and non-conformism. Conformism is 
the following view:  
(Conformism) 
In light of mutually recognized peer disagreement regarding p the epistemically rational 
response for both parties is to revise their doxastic attitude towards p so it is closer to that of 
the other party.  
 
Conformism predicts that disagreement with a recognized peer is always epistemically significant. 
Such disagreement rationally requires both parties to abandon their initial belief (non-degree-
theoretic framework) or their initial credence (degree-theoretic framework) and move closer to the 
other party. Hence the label “conformism” (another commonly used label is “conciliationism”).     
 The perhaps most widely discussed form of conformism is the equal weight view—thus 
called because it requires each view to carry equal weight:  
(Conformismew-full) 
In light of mutually recognized peer disagreement regarding p the epistemically rational 
response for both parties is to suspend belief regarding p (Feldman 2006, 2007).  
 
(Conformismew-degree) 
In light of mutually recognized peer disagreement regarding p the epistemically rational 
response for both parties is to assign each view equal weight. Put mathematically: if S1’s 
credence in p is x and S2’s credence is y (where x ≠ y), the credence of both S1 and S2 
should equal the average of x and y (Christensen 2007, 2008, Elga 2007). 
 
Within a full belief framework, the two parties’ views carry equal weight in the sense that their 
respective beliefs cancel each other out: they should both suspend belief about p. Within a degree-
theoretic framework, recognized disagreement carries equal weight in the sense that the credence of 
both parties should equal the average of the two initial credences.  
All versions of (Conformism) are symmetric in that they require doxastic revision from both 
parties. However, it is compatible with (Conformism) that the parties do not have to revise in the 
same way—that, e.g., one party should assign 0.8 weight to the other party’s view and 0.2 to her 
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own. Note, however, that equal weight versions of conformism are symmetric twice over: both 
parties are rationally required to doxastically revise, and they have to do so in the same way.  
According to (Conformismew-full), this means that both S1 and S2 should suspend belief about 
p. In (Perception) the disagreeing traffic cops should suspend belief about whether the car ran a red 
light. The same goes for (Arithmetic) and (Economic policy). According to (Conformismew-degree) 
the disagreeing parties should “split the difference” in each case. Suppose that in all three cases the 
initial degrees of belief of the disagreeing parties are respectively 0.8 and 0.2. Then the degree of 
belief of both traffic cops in <The car ran a red light> should be 0.5. Similarly, in the arithmetical 
and the economic policy cases.   
Non-conformism is the view that disagreement with a perceived peer does not always 
rationally mandate doxastic revision. This can happen symmetrically or asymmetrically:  
 
    (Non-conformismSYM) 
In light of mutually recognized peer disagreement regarding p it can be epistemically 
rational for both parties to maintain their initial doxastic attitude towards p (Foley 2001, 
Rosen 2001, Wedgwood 2007).  
 
(Non-conformismASYM) 
In light of mutually recognized peer disagreement regarding p it can be epistemically 
rational for one party (but not both) to maintain her initial doxastic attitude towards p (Kelly 
2005, Lackey 2010a, 2010b). 
 
To get the full-attitude version of symmetric and asymmetric non-conformism replace “doxastic 
attitude” with “belief”, to get the degree-theoretic version replace it with “credence”.  
 How might (Non-conformismSYM) be supported? Here is a simple argument: suppose that S1 
believes p. The truth of not-p is incompatible with the truth of p. So, when S1 learns of the 
disagreement with S2, from S1’s perspective there is reason to think that S2 is wrong. Similarly from 
the perspective of S2. Thus, both S1 and S2 can rationally maintain their initial doxastic attitude.  
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 This line of argument embodies a form of “epistemic egocentrism”, as it relies on the idea 
that the first-person perspective is privileged and epistemically decisive for each subject.3 
How about (Non-conformismASYM)? Some endorse this form of asymmetric non-
conformism by appealing to the so-called “right reasons view” (RRV): in cases of disagreement 
between recognized peers the party who in fact reasoned correctly from the evidence can rationally 
maintain her initial doxastic attitude while the other party cannot. This former party has the right 
reasons supporting her doxastic attitude. E.g., in (Arithmetic) suppose that the sequence of numbers 
in fact adds up to 5,863, and that this is your claim. In that case you can rationally maintain your 
initial belief that the sum of the sequence is 5,863 while I should revise my conflicting belief.  
 
3. Variations 
Let us introduce three further views concerning recognized peer disagreement: the total evidence 
view, the justificationist view, and the reasoning as grounding view. These can be regarded as 
refinements of conformism or non-conformism. 
According to the total evidence view (TEV) the body of total evidence determines what 
response is epistemically rational in the face of recognized peer disagreement. TEV includes both 
first-order evidence and higher-order evidence, respectively the evidence concerning p considered 
by the disagreeing parties and information about the disagreement (e.g., the epistemic status of the 
other party (or parties) and how many people hold the different views; Kelly 2010, Sect. 4). When a 
subject’s total evidence includes the information that a recognized peer holds a different view, TEV 
mandates doxastic revision: the subject should be less confident. So, TEV is a conformist view. 
However, it does not amount to equal weight conformism. The view says that some—but not 
necessarily equal—weight should be accorded to the view of a recognized peer.  
Consider the following case:  
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(Conjecture)—A mathematician proves a theorem that settles what has long been an open 
question—say, the Twin Prime Conjecture (i.e. the conjecture that there are infinitely many 
pairs of primes separated by a difference of two). However, suppose also that the whole 
mathematical community contests the proof (this case is modeled on Case 6 in Kelly 2010).  
 
TEV predicts that the mathematician should be less confident although she has reasoned correctly 
and in fact proved the Twin Prime Conjecture. In this respect, TEV is different from the RRV, 
which would attribute no significance to other members of the mathematical community because 
they have reasoned incorrectly. However, while conformist in nature, TEV is different from the 
equal weight view. It is compatible with TEV—but not RRV—that the mathematician can 
rationally remain quite confident in her initial belief vis-à-vis the disagreement. 
 According to the justificationist view (JV), what counts as epistemically rational responses 
in the face of recognized peer disagreement is determined by the subjects’ degree of justified 
confidence and, in some cases, certain kinds of information. If a subject has a low degree of 
justified confidence, then substantial doxastic revision is rationally required in the face of 
recognized peer disagreement. However, if she has a high degree of justified confidence, she can 
rationally maintain her initial doxastic attitude just in case she has a symmetry-breaker. A 
symmetry-breaker consists in personal information to the effect that her own epistemic situation is 
good together with the absence of this kind of information about the other party (Lackey 2010a, 
2010b).  
 JV is a non-conformist view, as it allows for no-revision cases. To see this consider the 
following case:  
(Pasta)—Jen is at the dining table with her flat mate Joe. Joe has a vivid experience as of 
talking to Sarah, their other flat mate, and as of her eating pasta with great gusto. Jen does 
not have this kind of experience—she has an experience as of Sarah’s not being present. Joe 
says to Jen, “Wow! Sarah is really enjoying the pasta!” Jen responds, “Sarah isn’t here.” Jen 
and Joe regard each other as peers with respect to perceptual judgments and have the same 
kind of evidence, perceptual experience. Jen is justified in believing about herself that she is 
not drunk; is not under the influence of any drugs; has 20/20 vision; and that she has no 
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history of hallucinating in the past. Furthermore, Jen does not have this kind of information 
about Joe. Jen is having veridical perceptual experiences. 
 
Jen has a high degree of justified confidence that Sarah is not present on the basis of ordinary 
perception. She also has personal information that provides a symmetry-breaker. For this reason Jen 
can rationally maintain her initial belief that Sarah is not present (Lackey 2010a). This suffices to 
show that JV is a brand of non-conformism.  
 Note that JV delivers doxastic revision verdicts for some cases and provides diagnostics for 
identifying them. To see this consider (Arithmetic). Since the two subjects are not mathematically 
gifted, they both have a low degree of justified confidence. Thus, according to JV, when they learn 
of the disagreement with one another, they are both rationally required to substantially revise their 
initial doxastic attitude.  
Wietmarschen (2013) draws a distinction between well-grounded belief and evidentially 
supported belief. One thing is to say that evidence E supports S’s belief that p—and thus gives S 
justification to believe that p; another thing is to say that S’s belief that p is epistemically well-
grounded by S’s evidence—and thus that S is justified in believing that p. Wietmarschen defends 
the reasoning as grounding view (RGV)—a form of conformism, understood as a view about well-
grounded belief. The distinction between evidentially supported and epistemically well-grounded 
belief allows for the possibility that a belief that p is epistemically supported by evidence E without 
being well-grounded by E. By appealing to this distinction one can assuage some of the problematic 
consequences that other forms of conformism have—in particular, the concern that conformist 
views seem to make the original evidence on which your belief is based epistemically insignificant 
(or at least, much less significant than before) once you come to know about the disagreement with 
your peer (Kelly 2010: 122-25). 
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         To illustrate the mechanics of RGV return to (Conjecture). Initially the mathematician’s 
belief that the Twin Prime Conjecture is true is well-grounded by her evidence, in the form of what 
she takes to be (and what is in fact) a proof of the conjecture. However, when she learns of the 
opposition from the mathematical community (including many mathematicians whom she regards 
as peers), this information provides a potential defeater. RGV predicts that this potential defeater 
undermines the well-groundedness of the mathematician’s belief. Thus she is no longer justified in 
believing the Twin Prime Conjecture and should doxastically revise. However, she still has 
justification to believe the conjecture. This is because her evidence is, in fact, a proof of the 
conjecture and evidentially supports her belief.  
 
4. Assessing the views  
In this section, we critically assess some of the views outlined above. The current literature is rich 
with interesting objections and challenges. However, given limitations of space we confine 
ourselves to a cursory review of a few prominent criticisms of the views presented in Sect. 2.         
Let us first review the pros and cons of conformism. One general virtue of conformism is 
that it aligns well with the natural idea that disagreement with someone regarded as a peer provides 
evidence that one has made a mistake in interpreting the original evidence, and that such evidence 
should make one less confident. However, conformist proposals have been subject to a variety of 
criticisms. We will briefly review four of them. 
         The first criticism puts pressure on the commitment to treat as epistemically irrelevant one’s 
original evidence, once the disagreement with a peer comes to light. This seems highly problematic 
because it completely disregards the possibility that one of the disagreeing parties might have 
reasoned impeccably, while the other has reasoned incorrectly (see Kelly 2010: 122-25 for the 
criticism and Christensen 2011: 4 for a reply). 
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         A second issue with conformism is its seeming self-defeating character. Suppose that as an 
epistemically well-informed conformist I disagree with an epistemically equally well-informed non-
conformist about the epistemic significance of peer disagreement. By my own lights in such a 
situation I should conciliate by decreasing my confidence in the correctness of my own view (or, 
working with full attitudes, suspend belief). But this seems absurd since it implies that “your view 
on disagreement requires you to give up your view on disagreement” (Elga 2010: 179. See also 
Weatherson 2013 and Reining 2016).  
         A third worry about conformism takes issue with the so-called Independence Principle—a 
key commitment of the view. As Christensen (2009: 758) formulates it: “In evaluating the epistemic 
credentials of another person’s belief about p, to determine how (if at all) to modify one’s own 
belief about p, one should do so in a way that is independent of the reasoning behind one’s own 
initial belief about p.” Suppose that I am extremely confident not only about the truth of my belief 
that p but also about the extreme reliability of the reasoning process that led me to believe that p. 
Let us suppose that I can fully introspect this process and assess its reliability in a way that, on this 
occasion, I have no reason to doubt is flawed. Moreover, suppose that I lack introspective 
awareness of the reliability of the other party’s reasoning process on this occasion. It would seem 
that I have reason not to conciliate. It would also seem that I have reason to think that the other 
party has made a mistake on this particular occasion. However, my reasons for not conciliating and 
for attributing fault to my opponent are not independent of the reasoning behind my initial belief 
and reasoning about p. Thus, they would be ruled out as epistemically significant in a conformist 
framework that incorporates the Independence Principle (Sosa 2010 and Lackey 2010a; see 
Christensen 2011: 9 for a reply and Christensen 2016, Kelly 2013: 37-43, and Lord 2014 for a 
comprehensive discussion of the Independence Principle). 
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 A fourth worry concerns the so-called Uniqueness Thesis—the idea that there is a uniquely 
rational response in the face of disagreement with a perceived peer. Versions of conformism appear 
to be committed to this thesis. For example, the equal weight view seems to be committed to saying 
that suspension of belief (Feldman 2006, 2007) or adopting the average of the two initial degrees of 
belief (Christensen 2007, 2008, Elga 2007) is the uniquely rational response for both parties. Some 
worry about uniqueness due to specific cases of disagreement that they take to constitute 
counterexamples. For example, people who grow up in religious communities and people who grow 
up among atheists might rationally take the same arguments or body of evidence to support 
different conclusions (the existence/non-existence of God) due to influences from their different 
backgrounds (Schoenfield 2014; for a non-case-based argument see Ballantyne and Coffman 2011; 
for an overview see Kopec and Titelbaum 2016, for defences see Christensen 2016 and White 
2005).  
 Let us now turn to a brief discussion of non-conformist views. One general advantage of 
such views is that they pay due respect to the subject’s original evidence, gathered prior to the 
situation of disagreement. After all, the mere fact that we happen to disagree with a peer should not 
make all the relevant evidence available to us up to that point epistemically insignificant. Moreover, 
non-conformist views support our strong intuition that in many cases where we can have 
introspective access to the reliability of the reasoning process that led to our opinion on the disputed 
matter, the fact that it is our own opinion and reasoning process we are considering should make a 
difference. However, there are also reasons to be skeptical about the general tenability of non-
conformist views. 
         One general worry is that a non-conformist attitude towards situations of recognized peer 
disagreement seems to encourage dogmatism leading, at its extreme, to the permissibility of a 
subject’s systematically disregarding any unfavorable evidence or contrary opinion (see Pedersen 
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2018 on strong forms of non-conformism). This seems to clash with the fact that we genuinely 
regard our opponent as an epistemic peer. And this, of course, would be a rather unwelcome 
consequence, especially in all those cases where neither subject has reason to believe that the 
situation is epistemically asymmetrical. 
         A related, but more specific, worry is discussed by Christensen (2007: 209; 2011: 5). 
Disagreement with your peer provides new evidence that significantly modifies your epistemic 
situation compared to your pre-disagreement situation. Non-conformist views seem to seriously 
downplay the epistemic significance of the presence of disagreement which is clearly a weakness of 
the view especially in those cases where both disputants regard each other as epistemic peers. After 
all, the fact that I regard you as an epistemic peer and that you disagree with me about whether p is 
a significant piece of evidence that should be factored in in my current epistemic situation—
evidence that somehow challenges the good standing of my pre-disagreement epistemic situation.  
What these very general criticisms of conformism and non-conformism suggest is that 
neither of them can be said to successfully provide a wholly general and adequate answer to 
(Significance-Peer). Non-conformist views seem right—contra conformist views—when they insist 
that the epistemic significance of our initial evidence should not be completely discarded in the face 
of disagreement with someone regarded as a peer. Conformists have it right—contra non-
conformists—when they insist that the presence of disagreement with a perceived peer has 
epistemic significance and changes the epistemic situations of the disputants. The three alternative 
pictures reviewed in Sect. 4 can be seen, roughly, as alternative ways of accommodating the 
positive features of both conformism and non-conformism while avoiding their respective 
shortcomings. In this respect, such alternatives represent genuine progress in the debate on peer 
disagreement.   
 
 To appear in: The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology, Ed. by M. Fricker, P. Graham, D. Henderson, and N.J.L.L. Pedersen 
 
5. Disagreement and varieties of rationality 
We are inclined to think that the peer disagreement debate has been conducted somewhat in 
isolation from other debates in epistemology. This is unfortunate since the epistemic significance of 
peer disagreement very much seems to be an issue related to other issues in epistemology. 
Differences between views on peer disagreement may well reflect—or be traceable to—differences 
in terms of broader epistemological commitments. To argue this point we draw a distinction 
between two kinds of rationality and discuss them in relation to the views introduced earlier.  
 Let us distinguish between internal and external rationality. A belief’s being internally 
rational amounts to its being (i) an appropriate response to phenomenal experiences associated with 
sensation or perception (being appeared to redly, etc.) or the exercise of memory, a priori reasoning, 
or introspection (seeming right, etc.), (ii) a member of a coherent belief system, (iii) a trigger of the 
right inferences when the occasion arises, (iv) a trigger of the right actions when occasion arises, 
and (v) its being held by a subject who prefers to believe what is true and gather further evidence 
when called for. A belief’s being externally rational amounts to its being based on phenomenal 
experiences that are the result of properly functioning cognitive capacities or reliable belief-forming 
processes. (The internal/external rationality distinction drawn here is very much inspired by 
Plantinga 2000: 110-12. Note, though, that the external rationality part is more liberal.)  
Internal rationality tracks whether a given belief is appropriately held given the subject’s 
phenomenal experiences and mental states. It is tied to the subject’s perspective—to factors that are 
internal to the subject. External rationality goes beyond the perspective of the subject. It tracks the 
epistemic status of the genesis or history of beliefs.  
Consider (Pasta*), a case obtained by adding the following information about Joe to (Pasta): 
(Pasta*)—Joe is justified in believing about himself that he is not drunk; is not under the 
influence of any drugs; has 20/20 vision; and that he has no history of hallucinating in the 
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past. Furthermore, Joe does not have this kind of information about Jen. Jen is having 
veridical perceptual experiences. However, unbeknownst to him Joe has been drugged with 
a hallucinogen. He is in fact hallucinating Sarah’s presence although he is not aware that he 
has been drugged and there are no way that he could discover it through experience, 
reflection, or introspection. 
 
What is the rational response in the face of the disagreement? Let us consider external and internal 
rationality in turn.  
Jen is externally rational while Joe is not. Her belief that Sarah is not present is based on 
phenomenal experiences that were brought about by a reliable belief-forming process. Recognizing 
the disagreement with Joe does nothing to undermine the good epistemic standing of the genealogy 
of Jen’s belief. Joe’s belief, on the other hand, is the result of hallucination. Hence, it fails to have 
the right epistemic pedigree and is not externally rational.4  
Matters are different when it comes to internal rationality. Jen’s belief is an appropriate 
response to her phenomenal experiences and mental states and integrates in the right way with 
inference and action. The same goes for Joe’s belief. E.g., if he believes that Sarah wants to have 
wine with pasta, he will infer that Sarah wants to drink wine. Furthermore, if Joe always wants to 
accommodate Sarah’s desire to drink wine, he will go fetch a bottle of wine upon forming the belief 
that Sarah wants to drink wine. For both Jen and Joe pressure to doxastically revise in order to 
maintain coherence in the face of the disagreement is alleviated by their respective symmetry-
breakers (i.e. justified beliefs to the effect that their own epistemic situation is good and the absence 
of such beliefs about the other party).  
 These considerations on (Pasta*) suggest that verdicts on specific cases may well depend on 
what kind of rationality is taken to be relevant to the issue of the epistemic significance of 
recognized peer disagreement. How do the views considered above relate to the external/internal 
rationality distinction, and what verdict do they issue regarding (Pasta*)?  
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 Let us start with conformism. The unifying commitment of conformist views is that it is not 
rational to maintain one’s initial doxastic attitude in the face of recognized peer disagreement. This 
is so on the equal weight view, the total evidence view, and any other conformist view. According 
to these views, once the disagreement comes within one’s purview, doxastic revision is rationally 
required. Since this demand is driven by the internalization of the fact of disagreement, we take the 
primary focus of conformists to be internal rationality.  
 How about non-conformist views? Here the picture is more complex. Some non-conformists 
seem to have in mind external rationality, others internal rationality, and yet others a hybrid kind of 
rationality.  
On the right reasons view the subject who in fact reasoned correctly can rationally maintain 
her initial doxastic attitude while the other party cannot. What matters is the genealogy of the 
beliefs of the disagreeing parties: who in fact reasoned correctly from the evidence. This very much 
suggests an external notion of rationality.  
 Non-conformists who are moved by the I’m-right-you’re-wrong line of reasoning think that 
each party to the disagreement gets evidence that the other party is wrong upon learning of the 
disagreement. It is the internalization of the fact of disagreement and the accompanying epistemic 
‘downgrade’ of the other party that underwrite the rationality of each party’s maintaining their 
initial doxastic attitude. This points to rationality in the internal sense.  
 Non-conformists of the justificationist stripe operate with a notion of rationality that is 
sensitive to both external and internal factors. Recall that two things underwrite rational non-
revision on the justificationist view: a high degree of justified confidence and a symmetry-breaker. 
Jen and Joe both have symmetry-breakers, i.e. justified beliefs to the effect that their own epistemic 
situation is good and an absence of such beliefs about the other party. However, only Jen has a high 
degree of justified confidence. This is explained by the genesis of their respective beliefs which 
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involves respectively veridical perception (Jen) and hallucination (Joe). Since Jen has both a high 
degree of justified confidence and a symmetry-breaker, she can rationally maintain her belief that 
Sarah is not present. Joe cannot rationally his conflicting belief because he fails to have a high 
degree of justified confidence. The rationality of Jen’s belief is of a mixed kind. It is sensitive to 
both an external factor and an internal one. Since symmetry-breakers are constituted by beliefs, they 
are an internal determiner of rationality. However, the epistemic pedigree or history of beliefs is an 
external matter.  
 The reasoning as grounding view (RGV) is a form of conformism and is thus concerned 
with internal rationality. Learning of a disagreement with a perceived peer defeats the well-
groundedness of each party’s belief and thereby rationally mandates doxastic revision. However, 
RGV accommodates external rationality as well, at least after a fashion. The view grants that 
someone who has reasoned correctly to p from evidence E still has justification to believe p 
(although, in the face of disagreement, they are not justified in believing p). In this sense it is still 
externally rational to believe p.   
As just argued, different views on peer disagreement appear to operate with different 
notions of rationality. It is unfortunate that much of the peer disagreement debate—especially in its 
early stages—has unfolded somewhat in isolation from broader epistemological issues. For, 
differences concerning the epistemic significance of peer disagreement may well be interlinked 
with one’s broader epistemological commitments—in particular, one’s explicit or implicit 
commitments regarding the nature of rationality and justification. Hence, being clear about basic 
commitments concerning the nature of rationality could help clarify the peer disagreement debate.  
Our own line on the issue concerning rationality is as follows. Most contributors to the 
debate implicitly assume that there is a single notion of rationality relevant to addressing the issue 
of the epistemic significance of recognized peer disagreement. We beg to differ. William Alston 
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(2005) argued that there is a plurality of epistemic desiderata, and that it is futile to try to restrict the 
focus of epistemology to just one of them (see also Pedersen 2017). Inspired by this kind of 
pluralist attitude we suggest pluralism about epistemic rationality as an interesting, viable option. 
When it comes to framing the peer disagreement debate, we do not take internal rationality and 
external rationality to be mutually exclusive. Rather, they are complementary. Internal rationality 
and external rationality both constitute positive epistemic standings. They are both philosophically 
interesting species of rationality and, as such, both are relevant to the issue of the epistemic 
significance of recognized peer disagreement.  
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